This study examines the influence of malpractice claims on the practice behavior of a panel of obstetricians in Florida during the period 1992-1995 to determine whether physicians respond to malpractice events by performing more cesareans, consistent with the notion that cesarean sections are employed as ''defensive medicine.'' Findings indicate that clinical events resulting in claims that lead to substantial indemnity payments have a significant, modest effect on physician practice behavior: physicians experiencing those claims increase their risk-adjusted cesarean rates by about one percentage point. Malpractice experience does not appear to affect patient mix, but claims with large payouts may affect patient volume.
This paper explores the influence of malpractice claims on the practice behavior of obstetricians in Florida during the period 1992-1995. Our primary intent is to determine whether physicians respond to malpractice events by performing more cesarean sections, consistent with the notion that cesarean sections are employed as ''defensive medicine.'' Academics and policymakers have long been interested in the influence of malpractice experience on physician behavior, particularly regarding the cesarean section, because the dramatic increase in U.S. cesarean rates during the 1970s and 1980s roughly correlated with a concomitant increase in the incidence and severity of malpractice claims over that period (Sachs 1989) . The recent rapid rise in U.S. medical malpractice insurance premiums (averaging 8% to 18% in 2002) has again brought this subject to prominence (Rubin 2001) . Obstetricians have been hard hit: in some states, their premiums have more than quadrupled (Babula 2002) , and there are reports of obstetricians closing their practices or limiting their patients because of increases in malpractice premiums.
Our analysis is conducted using a micro (physician-level) longitudinal estimation framework that is new to this literature. This framework mitigates concerns about omitted variables that arise in the cross-section studies which dominate the literature while retaining the advantages of a disaggregated analysis. It allows us to determine the features of a malpractice event that have the strongest influence on physician behavior: Is it the resolution of the claim that leads to defensive medicine, or the incident that spawned the claim in the first place? In addition, we explore the influence of malpractice events on three kinds of physician behavior: the volume (number) of deliveries performed, the clinical risk of cesarean section of patients accepted by the physician, Darren Grant, Ph.D. , is coordinator of the health care administration program in the Department of Economics, University of Texas at Arlington. Melayne Morgan McInnes, Ph.D., is an associate professor in the Department of Economics, University of South Carolina. Address correspondence to Prof. Grant at Department of Economics, Box 19479, University of Texas at Arlington, Arlington TX 76019-0479. Email: dgrant@uta.edu and the procedure intensity used in performing those deliveries (the physician's risk-adjusted cesarean rate).
We find that physicians experiencing malpractice claims that lead to substantial indemnity payouts increase their risk-adjusted cesarean rates by about one percentage point. Behavior changes are associated with the incident that led to the malpractice claim, not with the resolution of the claim. While there is no evidence physicians turn away riskier patients in response to malpractice claims, there may be some effect on the number of deliveries performed by the physician.
The paper is arranged as follows. First, surveys and academic studies investigating the extent of defensive medicine in obstetrics are discussed. We then present a model of physician behavior, the data used to implement that model, and our estimation framework. Results are followed by discussion and conclusions.
Previous Research

Malpractice Liability and Defensive Medicine
In a seminal article, Kessler and McClellan (1996) presented evidence that medical malpractice liability laws affect the way physicians practice medicine. They compared treatment of Medicare patients for ischemic heart disease and acute myocardial infarction across time and states to assess the impact of tort reform. They found that reforms that directly reduce malpractice awards reduce medical expenditures without increasing mortality or complications. In a subsequent paper that disaggregated expenditures for acute heart disease (Kessler and McClellan 2000) , they found that malpractice reforms impact diagnostic expenditures more than therapeutic expenditures. In fact, therapeutic expenditures may increase slightly when malpractice pressure is reduced, as physicians become more willing to treat marginal, riskier patients when there is less chance of being sued in the event of an adverse outcome.
When physicians were surveyed about the effect of medical malpractice liability on their practice decisions, Kessler and McClellan (1998) found that physicians' personal experiences were an important determinant of the perceived importance of defensive medicine. Physicians who had a claim filed against them in the previous year were more likely to report changing their practice due to concerns about malpractice, and the effect was larger if the physician worked in a state where malpractice pressure was greater. These changes included increases in record keeping, diagnostic testing, referrals for consultations, and time spent with patients. Taken together, Kessler and McClellan's studies lead us to expect that defensive medicine will increase among obstetricians who have had claims filed against them.
Malpractice Liability and the Delivery of Obstetrical Care
Surveys of obstetricians undertaken by the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (1983 , 1985 are consistent with the surveys reported by Kessler and McClellan. Throughout the 10 years of surveys, obstetricians nationwide and in Florida specifically consistently reported changing their practice in response to malpractice pressures: 20% to 30% reported accepting fewer high-risk patients; 10% to 15% reported performing fewer deliveries; and another 10% to 15% reported no longer practicing obstetrics. The 1983 survey (the only to so inquire) indicates that these changes were observed more frequently in obstetricians who had been sued more frequently. In addition, in early surveys, a majority of obstetricians reported increasing the number of testing, diagnostic, or monitoring procedures in response to malpractice risk. These procedures also may have led to an increase in the rate of cesarean section. (For example, electronic fetal monitoring is associated with cesarean use, and malpractice fears may increase its use. This can lead to more cesareans even if physicians' criteria for performing cesareans are not affected by malpractice concerns [see Tussing and Wojtowycz 1997] .) Complementing these findings are additional surveys in which physicians reported responding to liability concerns by reducing obstetrical services, particularly for high-risk women (Lewis-Idema 1989), or by changing the number of diagnostic tests (Lawthers et al. 1992 ). Because of well-known flaws with self-reported data, however, policy analysts hesitate to rely on conclusions drawn from surveys alone.
Of course, academic studies have investigated these issues as well. Most have examined the link between malpractice liability and use of the cesarean section. 1 Two methodological dimensions along which these studies differ are whether the analysis is cross sectional or longitudinal, and whether the unit of analysis is the physician or a more aggregated unit such as the hospital or region.
Aggregated cross-sectional analyses typically relate malpractice insurance premiums (a measure of the malpractice environment) to cesarean rates across areas. Studies using regional data have found a positive relationship between the two. Rock (1988) found a raw correlation between malpractice premium levels and cesarean rates within the state of Illinois; a doubling of premiums increased the primary cesarean rate by 1% to 3%. In addition, Localio et al. (1993) found that the malpractice experience of the physician's region or hospital peer group has a statistically significant association with riskadjusted cesarean rates in the state of New York, as did Tussing and Wojtowycz (1997) in a county-level analysis. On the other hand, the two studies that used nationwide data, Silver and Wolfe (1989) and Newton and Higgins (1989) , failed to find an association between premiums and cesarean rates. All of these studies, however, had limited controls and thus might have omitted important regional factors, such as urbanization, that may be correlated with malpractice risk and use of the cesarean section.
Cross-sectional, physician-level studies (Goyert et al. 1989; Carpenter et al. 1987; Baldwin et al. 1995; Localio et al. 1993 ), in contrast, have found no association between individual physician malpractice experience and physician risk-adjusted cesarean rates within a given state or region. Again, these studies may have suffered from omitted variable bias. If more skilled obstetricians used less invasive delivery methods (fewer cesareans), for example, then cross-sectional analyses would be biased toward finding a positive relationship between cesarean rates and claims experience. On the other hand, if cesareans reduced malpractice exposure, then physicians who performed more cesareans would have fewer malpractice claims, even if physicians did not change their behavior in response to the malpractice environment. Here the bias is in the negative direction.
A longitudinal study removes biases associated with omitting time-invariant factors that are related to malpractice risk and use of the ce-sarean section. To date, however, the only longitudinal study in the literature is Dubay, Kaestner, and Waidmann (1999) , who related county-level cesarean rates to regional malpractice insurance premiums over the period 1990-1992. They found a small but significant effect of malpractice premiums on cesarean rates for most demographic groups: a $10,000 increase in the annual premium raised risk-adjusted cesarean rates by 0 to .4 percentage points. There was no improvement in birth outcomes, as measured by the Apgar score, suggesting the increase in cesareans was not medically justified.
A third dimension along which these studies differ is the measurement of malpractice risk faced by the physician, an issue raised by previous authors (Baldwin et al. 1995; Localio et al. 1993) . Regional analyses often use malpractice premiums (Localio et al. 1993; Dubay, Kaestner, and Waidmann 1999) , while physician-level studies, in contrast, tend to use the number of claims per physician. 2 Neither describes the malpractice environment perfectly. The number of claims per physician ignores the magnitude, or severity, of the claims, and ignores the possible effect of claims against peers on the physician's perceived risk. The premium measure does not have these weaknesses, but has its own potential problems. For one, it does not vary among physicians within the same region. And, while premiums do depend both on claim frequency and claim severity, they also depend on other market factors, such as interest rates and market competitiveness, and hence may measure the malpractice environment poorly. In fact, malpractice premiums have not closely tracked claim outlays over the last decade (Zimmerman and Oster 2002, nationally; Reed, St. John, and Torres 2003, in Florida) . Furthermore, the premium measure has a conceptual weakness: if physicians respond to increased premium costs by performing more profitable cesareans rather than vaginal births (target income inducement), one may find that physicians do not change their behavior after a claim. Instead, they will respond to an annual increase in their malpractice premium, whether or not they experienced a claim in the previous year.
Our study complements Dubay, Kaestner, and Waidmann (1999) by conducting a longitudinal analysis at the physician level. This allows us to explore questions not considered in that study, such as whether physicians drop high-risk patients in response to adverse malpractice experience. It can help us understand the mechanism through which malpractice risk influences physician behavior. And, by using a different unit of analysis and a different measure of malpractice risk, it can explore the robustness of the conclusions reached in that former study.
Conceptual Framework
In Chetty's (1998) model of the obstetrician's decision problem, the mother's true risk of cesarean section is unknown, but physicians observe a risk index and choose a threshold value of that index above which a cesarean is performed. This threshold determines the physician's procedure intensity:
his risk-adjusted cesarean rate. A higher threshold reduces the incidence of Type II error (failing to perform a cesarean when needed) but increases the likelihood of Type I error (unnecessary cesareans). Physicians choose the threshold given the probability a patient sues after a vaginal birth that has been inappropriately performed, the size of the malpractice award, and the financial incentive (or disincentive) for performing the cesarean.
Chetty's model suggests that the probability P(C jpt ) that physician p performs a cesarean on patient j in year t can be expressed as:
where C is a dummy that equals one if a cesarean is performed and zero otherwise, X j is a vector of patient characteristics from which the risk index is constructed, and É pt is a scalar that represents the risk threshold above which the physician will perform a cesarean. This threshold will be influenced by preferences, the marketwide malpractice environment, technology, and financial incentives, but not the physician's malpractice history. In this model, uncertainty arises only in assessing an individual patient's risk. Therefore a physician who experiences a claim has no reason to alter his cesarean threshold; variation in cesarean rates among physicians is due only to variation in financial incentives and other factors external to Chetty's model. Now consider, instead, that physicians may be uncertain about the probability of being sued or the costs, including emotional costs, of fighting a malpractice claim. Indeed, such uncertainty would appear to be pervasive. Localio et al. (1990) , examining patient records in New York state, found that an adverse event attributable to medical negligence generated a malpractice claim only 1.5% of the time. In addition, claims were generated from patients who were not treated negligently .12% of the time. Farber and White (1991) , in an analysis of hospital claims, reported that experts retained by the hospital could not agree on the quality of care (negligent or not negligent) 30% of the time. Ward (1991) , examining 294 obstetrics-related malpractice claims, found that only 27% were indefensible. These studies and others suggest that the malpractice system is, in the words of Kessler and McClellan (1996, p. 353) , ''neither specific nor sensitive in providing compensation.'' Thus, it is reasonable to suppose that physicians may be unsure about the relation between the care they provide and the number and severity of claims they are likely to face. Such uncertainty may help to explain why physicians overestimate the probability of being sued by a factor of three and overestimate the probability of being sued following a negligent event by a factor of 30 (Lawthers et al. 1992) . 3 Furthermore, since a physician experiences few claims over his lifetime, it is reasonable to suppose that he/she also may be uncertain about the difficulty or cost of resolving a claim (merited or unmerited). Physicians can protect themselves from many of the direct financial costs of being sued through liability insurance. Nonetheless, a physician may fear that a claim will result in a loss of patients, sanctions from the state medical board, increases in future malpractice insurance premiums, or loss of insurance. There is some evidence that physicians may lose patients following a claim (Fournier and McInnes 2002) , but board sanctions (Fournier and McInnes 1997) , premium increases, and loss of insurance are rare (Sloan, Bovbjerg, and Githens 1991) . In addition, defending a claim requires time and energy: the typical physician reports losing three to five days of practice doing so (Lawthers et al. 1992) . Complementing these potential economic losses is the psychological burden of being sued. Physicians describe themselves as feeling ''under siege'' and ''victims'' of a tort system that has changed the traditional doctor/patient relationship into an adversarial interaction (Institute of Medicine 1989, pp. 88-89) . These feelings are likely to affect physicians' perceptions about an injured patient's propensity to sue, and the costs, emotional and financial, of being sued. These perceptions may be reinforced or overturned following experience with the tort system, but either way, we expect physician behavior will change.
Adding this uncertainty to the model described previously causes the physician's risk-adjusted cesarean rate to vary by individual malpractice experience. We now can express the physician's choice of cesarean threshold, É pt , in this way:
where È p reflects the time-invariant aspect of physicians' procedure intensity, such as preferences; Z t contains variables characterizing the malpractice environment, technology, and others that at time t are common to all physicians; MALHIST pt is a set of variables capturing the physician's own malpractice history prior to time t; and OTHER pt includes other time-varying influences, such as financial incentives. We would like to uncover the influence of MALHIST pt on É pt expressed in equation 2.
Unfortunately, in cross-sectional, physicianlevel data, this relationship will be obscured by reverse correlation from physician cesarean rates to malpractice experience. In a market described by Chetty's original model, for example, all variation in risk-adjusted cesarean rates across physicians is caused by physician-specific factors such as preferences. Because physicians with higher cesarean rates are sued less frequently, the cross-sectional correlation between physician cesarean rates and physician malpractice experience in this market is negative, and runs causally from procedure intensity to malpractice experience, not the other way around. In our more general model, with uncertainty, this negative correlation will co-exist with the positive relationship expected in equation 2 and therefore will complicate estimation.
A slight reformulation of equation 2 will substantially ameliorate this problem. Because this reverse correlation is generated by variation across physicians in their procedure intensity at each point in time, much of its effect can be eliminated, statistically, by differencing across timeby relating the change in physicians' procedure intensities to the change in their malpractice his-tories, ceteris paribus. That is, instead of equation 2, we attempt to uncover the following relationship:
This equation illustrates how physician behavior changes in response to recent malpractice events experienced by the physician. This is what we want to know.
The uncertainty in our theoretical model suggests malpractice variables that belong in this equation and indicates how these variables could be related to procedure intensity. Most importantly, the relation between malpractice experience and procedure intensity need not be simply ''more suits lead to more cesareans.'' Instead, if claims that are easily or cheaply resolved make the physician less fearful of future malpractice claims, those physicians' use of the cesarean will decrease, while physicians experiencing claims that are lengthy or expensive may become more fearful and perform more cesareans. Thus, the impact of any single malpractice event on physician procedure intensity is ambiguous. It therefore follows that a measure of the ''severity'' of the malpractice event-the seriousness of the claim or the difficulty resolving it-is warranted in the empirical analysis. We measure the severity of the claim by the award paid to the plaintiff and the difficulty in resolving the claim by the insurer's expenses in defending the claim. Finally, even if a malpractice event provides new information about the tort system that influences physician behavior, the timing of this new information is not obvious. If physicians misestimate the probability of being sued conditional on delivery method, then behavior changes will be associated with the clinical event that led to the claim or the origination of the claim. But if physicians misestimate the unpleasantness and difficulty of resolving a dispute, behavior changes will be associated with the resolution of the claim, not its origination. To investigate this timing issue, we compare malpractice measures based on claims origination with others based on claims resolution. This is possible because the interval between the clinical event and claim disposition averages three years, as discussed subsequently. All of these considerations turn out to be relevant for our estimations.
An additional issue that arises in the surveys discussed earlier, but is not embedded in Chetty's model, is the role of the malpractice system in sorting patients with physicians. The malpractice system ''works'' if it sorts riskier cases away from less-skilled physicians and penalizes those physicians by reducing their customer base (Fournier and McInnes 2002) . We explore the effect of malpractice claims on sorting by relating claims to changes in the number of deliveries performed by the physician (volume) and the clinical riskiness of those deliveries (clinical risk) by replacing ÁÉ pt in equation 3 with each of these measures.
Data
To estimate equation 3, we must observe the behavior (procedure intensity, volume, clinical risk) of a set of physicians at two points in time and the malpractice claims experienced by each physician in the intervening years (this is the change in the physician's malpractice history). Accordingly, in this paper we relate the change in Florida obstetricians' behavior between 1992 and 1995 to their malpractice experience in 1993 and 1994 and some control variables.
Our three measures of physician behavior were calculated from the 1992 and 1995 Florida Hospital Patient Discharge Data, publicly available from Florida's Agency for Health Care Administration. These data contain physician and hospital identifiers, diagnosis-related groups (DRGs), maternal demographics, and up to 10 medical diagnoses for every patient discharge from (nonfederal) Florida hospitals in each year. The sample included all obstetricians who performed at least 10 births in each year and had all the information on physician characteristics subsequently described: a total of 835 obstetricians. In 1992, these physicians accounted for 135,604 births, or 74% of all births in the data. In 1995, these physicians accounted for 114,437 births, or 69% of all births in the data. The following information was identified for each birth and used in risk adjustment: maternal age; its square; and dummies for placenta previa, abruptio placentae, mild pre-eclampsia, severe pre-eclampsia, uterine hemorrhage, diabetes, hypertension, multiple fetus, face/brow presentation, breech, transverse or oblique presentation, prematurity, cervical incompetence, prior cesar-ean, herpes, uterine rupture, cord prolapse, low birthweight, high birthweight, dystocia, fetal distress, and disproportion. 4 Medical malpractice claims histories for individual physicians were taken from the Florida Medical Professional Liability Insurance Claims File, publicly available from Florida's Department of Insurance. All medical malpractice insurers are required by state law to report a closed (resolved) claim to the Department of Insurance within 60 days of closing. These data are publicly available and include out-of-court settlements even if a claim was settled prior to the filing of a suit; they do not include claims that were filed but not closed as of May 2002, when the data were obtained. As discussed shortly, we believe these unresolved claims represent less than 5% of all claims resulting from incidents in 1993 and 1994. For each claim, we obtained the date the injury occurred (occurrence date), the date the claim was reported to the insurer (report date), and the date the claim was closed (disposition date), as well as the amount paid to the plaintiff (indemnity payment) and the amount paid by the insurer in defending the claim (loss adjustment expenses). Any of these can be used to measure the malpractice experience of the physician during 1993 and 1994. By determining which has the most explanatory power, we can uncover which aspect of a malpractice event has the strongest influence on behavior. In particular, if behavior changes are associated with the incident that led to the claim, we anticipate that the occurrence date, reporting date, and indemnity payout (an indicator of the magnitude of the injury that caused the claim) should be most important. If behavior changes are more closely associated with the resolution of the claim, then the disposition date and loss adjustment expense (an indicator of the difficulty of fighting the claim) should be most important. While these measures do not directly assess the malpractice risk, or changes in risk, perceived by the physician, they are more refined and complete than most measures used in previous physician-level studies, and thus hopefully serve as better proxies. The 835 physicians in our sample experienced 455 claims (occurring, reported, or closed) during the 1993-1994 period, with a total indemnity payout of $71,488,834. 5 Because we did not observe claims until they closed, there may have been some claims resulting from occurrences prior to 1995 that had yet to close as of May 2002, when the data were obtained. To gauge the extent of the censoring, we examined all medical malpractice claims arising from treatment in 1987 and 1988 by Florida physicians, in Figures 1 and 2. On average, there were 3.1 years between the occurrence and disposition of a claim, and 1.2 years between occurrence and reporting. (Restricting the sample to claims likely to be obstetrics-related did not substantially change the results.) Only about 5% of claims from the years 1987-1988 took more than seven years to close. Thus, the number of claim occurrences or reported claims from the years 1993-1994 that were not closed and hence did not appear in the data should be small because our data are current through mid-2002, more than seven years after December 1994. In addition, the substantial time interval between claim occurrences and claim resolution suggests that we can expect to distinguish the behavioral influence of the two in our estimations. In contrast, there is a much shorter interval between claim occurrences and claim reports. Both of these are associated with the initiation of a claim, so in some estimations the predictive power of occurrences and reports together is contrasted with that of disposed claims.
Medical malpractice has been associated with periodic crises in which rising claims frequency and severity are blamed for rapid increases in premiums and declining availability of coverage (Sloan, Bovbjerg, and Githens 1991) . Changes in law enacted in response to these crises tend to sharply reduce the number of suits. The period 1992-1995, however, was relatively stable in Florida in this regard; no major tort reform was enacted and the number of claims was fairly con-stant. Figure 3 shows the frequency of claims by occurrence date for all Florida physicians (results were similar for our sample of obstetricians). Tort reforms enacted in 1985 and 1986 (the Comprehensive Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1985 and the Tort Reform and Insurance Act of 1986) had a large effect on claim frequency, but this had leveled off by the early 1990s. Individual physicians might have been surprised at the virulence or unpleasantness of a suit filed against them, but physicians as a group should not have needed to revise their expectations of the likelihood of being sued over this period. Table 1 shows the distribution of claims from occurrences in 1992 and earlier and those in 1993-1994 for our sample of 835 obstetricians. More than half of the obstetricians in our sample have no claims in either period. Although those with claims in the earlier period are more likely to have claims in the latter period, the majority still have no claims. The persistence of risk is ex- , 1986-1994 pected (Fournier and McInnes 2001) but there is much randomness in the process as well. Table 2 shows the distribution of claims after eliminating ''nuisance claims'' that close with no payment by the insurer. The distribution is not substantially changed.
Empirical Specification
The effect of malpractice experience on procedure intensity is estimated in two stages, which correspond to equations 1 and 3 in our theoretical analysis. Because physicians' procedure intensities, É pt , are not observed directly, they first must be estimated from the Hospital Discharge Data.
The second stage relates changes in procedure intensity between 1992 and 1995 to malpractice experience during the period 1993-1994.
In the first stage, we estimate equation 1, P(C jpt ¼ 1) ¼ f(X j , É pt ), for both 1992 and 1995. It turns out that relationships for both years can be estimated jointly and that it is advantageous to do this. In a cross-sectional regression, physician procedure intensities would be represented by a set of physician fixed effects, m p , where p is the p th physician. These fixed effects, which are regression parameters, allow any patient's probability of cesarean section to depend on the identity of the physician attending the delivery. For the longitudinal equation, we need two sets of fixed effects, because we employ two years of data. Therefore, we specify É pt ¼ m p þ l p D t , where m p and l p are estimated parameters-the fixed effects-and D t is a dummy variable equal to one in 1995 and zero in 1992. Then m p represents the physician's procedure intensity in 1992, l p represents the change in procedure intensity between 1992 and 1995, and the sum m p þl p estimates procedure intensity in 1995. Hence, we estimate the following firststage equation:
where F is the cumulative normal distribution function and g is a vector of parameters associated with the risk adjustment variables X. Although m and l directly determine physicians' riskadjusted cesarean rates, they are not measured in conventional units (such as percentage points), since they are probit coefficients. This poses no difficulty for the analysis except that these coefficients must be interpreted with care. Changes in procedure intensity, which are the dependent variable in the second stage, therefore are estimated directly in equation 4, as l p . The second stage, following equation 3, relates intertemporal changes in procedure intensity to the malpractice events experienced by the physician during 1993 and 1994 and to control variables. The empirical analog to ÁÉ in equation 3 is the change in procedure intensity estimated in the first stage regression: l p . Therefore, for the second stage, we estimate:
where MAL is a vector of malpractice variables, PHYSCHAR is a vector of physician characteristics, and ÁPAYER is the change in the insurance mix of the physician's patients, intended to capture changes in financial incentives. We do not attempt to account for marketwide factors-Z in the theoretical model-explicitly. Because our sample period did not have any major tort reforms or Based on the earlier discussion, we consider several ways of assessing the physician's experience with the tort system between 1992 and 1995. Each includes a measure of the number of claims experienced and a measure of the severity of the claims experienced. In our initial ''all claims'' model, a claim is counted (once) if any of the following occurs during the years 1993-1994: the clinical event (occurrence) that inspires the claim, the reporting of the claim, or the disposition of the claim. The severity measure is the log of the total payout in those suits (plus one dollar, to prevent taking the log of zero). The explanatory power of payout in logs consistently exceeded that of payout in levels in preliminary tests. The defensive medicine hypothesis that physicians respond to adverse malpractice events by performing more cesareans is equivalent to asserting that some or all of the malpractice coefficients exceed zero. The physician characteristics are age, sex, and dummies identifying board certification and a U.S. medical degree. 7 The insurance variables are the change in the fraction of the physician's deliveries paid for by Medicaid/self-pay/charity and, separately, by a health maintenance organization (HMO). (Florida does not increase the Medicaid reimbursement to physicians for cesarean deliveries so there is no financial incentive to perform a cesarean for these mothers.) Means and standard deviations of key variables, along with definitions and data sources, are presented in Table 3 .
The effect of a malpractice claim on the clinical risk of the physician's patients or patient volume is estimated in a similar manner. Volume can be obtained directly from the Hospital Discharge Data; then we simply re-estimate equation 5 with the change in volume between 1992 and 1995 as the dependent variable (and the same independent variables as before). The same technique is used regarding clinical risk, except that clinical risk first must be estimated from the Hospital Discharge Data. This is done by calculating the change in each physician's expected cesarean rate between 1992 and 1995 using the vector of risk-adjustment controls. 8 
Results
First-Stage Regressions
Figures 4 and 5 contain scatterplots of unadjusted cesarean rates and the analog of risk-adjusted cesarean rates (the fixed effects estimated in the first-stage regression) for each of the 835 physicians in the data for 1992 and 1995. 9 These scatterplots confirm that there was considerable variation across physicians in procedure intensity and overall cesarean rates in both years. The stan-dard deviation of unadjusted cesarean rates in each year is about 10 percentage points; the standard deviation of the risk-adjusted cesarean rates is about 6.5 percentage points. 10 Given an overall cesarean rate in the sample of 25%, this is a large degree of variation. There is some regression to the mean in unadjusted cesarean rates, because the standard deviation in 1995 is smaller than in 1992, but not in the risk-adjusted rates, which have similar standard deviations in 1992 and 1995. .34 (.56) Note: N ¼ 835. Standard errors are in parentheses. Change in procedure intensity is a measure of the change in the physician's use of the cesarean section, ceteris paribus, estimated from a first-stage probit regression described in the text. The dependent variable in this regression is the first-stage probit coefficient; presented in brackets is the absolute value of the effect of a one unit change in the independent variable on the average physician's risk-adjusted cesarean rate, in percentage points. Clinical risk is the physician's predicted cesarean rate, estimated using the risk adjustment model discussed in the text, and measured in percentage points. Volume is the number of deliveries attended by the physician. Control variables include dummies for male physician, board certification, and U.S. medical degree, physician age, change in fraction of the physician's Medicaid/self-pay patients, change in the fraction of the physician's HMO patients, and a constant. Regressions are weighted by births (clinical risk) or the inverse of the square of the standard error on the first-stage coefficients used as dependent variables in the second-stage regression (procedure intensity). a The cross-sectional regressions use the 1995 value (not the 1992-1995 change) of procedure intensity, clinical risk, and volume as the dependent variables, and the physicians' full malpractice history prior to 1995 (not just during 1993-1994) in forming the independent variables. This specification is the cross-section analog to the longitudinal specification in row 1. * Significant at 5%. ** Significant at 10%.
While there was great variation in adjusted and unadjusted cesarean rates across physicians, there was considerable persistence in individual physician cesarean rates across the 1992-1995 period. This is clearly visible in Figures 4 and 5 . 11 However, there is also intertemporal variation, some of which may be due to differences in malpractice experience across physicians. The purpose of our second-stage estimations is to quantify this relationship. The variation and persistence in physician procedure intensities support our use of the longitudinal specification in equation 5, which differences out the effect of all time-invariant factors that might be correlated with malpractice experience and procedure intensity. Table 4 contains regression results for several specifications of the second-stage regression that relates changes in physician behavior to malpractice experience. Columns of the table correspond to the three different dependent variables representing the three types of physician behavior being examined. Rows of the table use different independent variables-specifically, different indicators of malpractice experience. For all regressions, only the coefficients on the malpractice indicators are presented; coefficients on the control variables (which are present in all regressions) are suppressed (but are available from the authors upon request). 12 Initially, we focus on changes in procedure intensity, that is, changes in physicians' underlying propensity to perform cesareans. This is shown in the first two columns of the table.
Second-Stage Regressions
The first row of the table presents our initial ''all claims'' model described earlier. In this model, both malpractice indicators are significantly related to propensity to perform cesareans. The coefficient on the claims variable is negative, while the coefficient on the payment variable is positive. To determine the net influence of any single claim on procedure intensity, one must combine these two effects. Thus, if a malpractice claim is large enough, in terms of the indemnity payout, physicians' use of the cesarean section will increase; however, if the claim is sufficiently small, use of the cesarean decreases. Both occur over the feasible range of payouts for the suits observed in our data. The average indemnity for claims with a positive indemnity payout is $202,000; this claim leads to a 1.0 percentage point increase in the physician's risk-adjusted cesarean rate. On the other hand, a suit that is resolved without payment leads to a reduction in the risk-adjusted cesarean rate of .6 percentage points. (This latter result is not an artifact of the specification of the model: when suits dropped without payment are isolated using a separate dummy variable, the coefficient indicates a similar reduction in the risk-adjusted cesarean rate.) These results are consistent with the theoretical analysis discussed previously, in which suits influence behavior by reducing physician uncertainty about the likelihood or unpleasantness of experiencing a malpractice claim. Large claims therefore make physicians more defensive, in terms of their procedure intensity; easily resolved claims make them slightly less defensive.
Because the number of claims and size of the payout work in opposite directions, the aggregate effect of claims on behavior cannot be determined from the regression coefficients alone. Substituting the mean values of claims and log payouts into the regression in the first row leads to an aggregate effect of malpractice experience on cesarean rates of .04 percentage points: in aggregate, at the margin, the malpractice system has at best a small effect on cesarean rates. This is consistent with the findings of the other longitudinal study in the literature, Dubay, Kaestner, and Waidmann (1999) .
The next three regressions attempt to uncover the ways that a suit influences behavior, by altering the timing of the malpractice variables included in the analysis. In the baseline model, a claim is counted (once) if any of the following is observed during the period 1993-1994: the occurrence that inspires the claim, the reporting of the claim, or the disposition of the claim. In the new models, 1993-1994 occurrences and reported claims (together) are distinguished from claims disposed of during the 1993-1994 period. If behavior is influenced by the incident that spawned the claim or by the initiation of the claim, only the former measure should be relevant; if behavior is influenced by the difficulties of claim resolution instead, only the latter measure should be relevant. Whether entered in the regression separately or jointly, claim occurrences are significant while disposed claims are not. This suggests that behavior changes are motivated by the incident that led to the claim or by the origination of the claim; behavior already has changed by the time the claim is resolved.
This conclusion is also supported by the fifth regression in the table, which uses an alternative measure of the severity of the claim: the log of loss adjustment expenses, which replaces the log of indemnity payouts. Loss adjustment expenses include all costs of litigating a claim; analysis of the malpractice data indicates that loss adjustment expenses are closely related to the length of time necessary to resolve the claim and the number of stages in the legal process (filing suit, going to trial, appealing a judgment) utilized in doing so. This alternative measure performs poorly in the regression-neither malpractice coefficient is larger nor significant. The difficulty of resolving the claim is not related to procedure intensity, but to the magnitude of the indemnity payout-an indicator of the seriousness of the incident that generated the claim. (Of the five regressions we have discussed, the first ''all-claims'' regression has the best fit.)
The remaining columns of the table explore the influence of malpractice experience on volume and clinical risk. There is no evidence that clinical risk responds to malpractice experience: coefficients are generally small and always insignificant. Malpractice experience may have some effect on volume: a few coefficients are significant or marginally significant. 13 Because preparing a defense takes time, we expect physicians to lose practice days following an occurrence that leads to the filing of a suit (Lawthers et al. 1992) . Our results appear to be consistent with this temporary reduction in patient volume, but the effect of claims occurrences is never statistically significant. Physicians who experience large claims do lose patients at the time the claim is disposed. This suggests a demand-side explanation in which patients learn about a claim after its disposition, with large verdicts conveying the most damaging news.
Taken together, these results suggest that malpractice experience influences physician behavior primarily by influencing procedure intensity, but large claims also may negatively affect delivery volume. The system does not encourage highrisk patients to match with physicians who have been sued less frequently.
Comparison with Other Micro Studies
Our physician-level analysis has uncovered a relationship between malpractice experience and physician behavior. Other physician-level studies (discussed earlier) do not. The difference in results can be traced to differences in methodology. In the introduction we highlighted one key methodological difference in this study-the longitudinal estimation approach-but there is another as well: the measurement of physician malpractice experience. Physician malpractice experience measures in our study account for the timing and severity of claims experienced, unlike those in most other micro-level studies. It turns out that this is the more important methodological difference.
Our empirical results indicate that small and large claims have opposite effects on behavior, and that the average effect of a claim is very small. Therefore, it should not be surprising to find no relationship between claims and behavior when the regression omits a measure of claims magnitude. In the sixth regression in Table 4 , we re-estimate our model omitting the payout variable. The coefficient on suits is indeed small and insignificant. It is only when one accounts for the severity of the claim-the indemnity payout-that the relationship between malpractice experience and procedure intensity is uncovered. Since most previous studies did not have this information, they could not test for this more complex relationship. Similarly, timing matters. A study relying on disposed claims alone also might not find a relationship between malpractice experience and physician behavior when one exists: in our regression results, physician procedure intensity responds to the initiation of a claim, not to its disposition.
The last row of Table 4 explores the importance of the other fundamental difference between previous physician-level studies and ours-the longitudinal estimation method-by running a crosssectional regression of physician behavior in 1995 on claims prior to 1995. Here this difference does not seem to matter, at least for procedure intensity: cross-sectional estimates are similar to the longitudinal estimates. These results suggest that careful attention to the measurement of physician malpractice experience is the more important methodological feature to consider.
Discussion
To discuss the implications of our results, it is useful to return to the framework of our theoretical model. That framework was one of uncertainty, in which physicians are poorly informed about the risk of being sued and the resulting financial and emotional costs. The provider adjusts his cesarean threshold (which determines the risk-adjusted cesarean rate) as he/she learns from his interaction with the malpractice system. This can happen at different stages of a claim, and can result in an increase in the physician's cesarean threshold, leading to fewer cesareans, or in a lower threshold and more cesareans.
Our empirical results do in fact suggest that physicians learn from the experience of having claims. Physicians who experience small claims payouts may find the experience not as bad as expected and thus not raise, or perhaps lower, their cesarean thresholds. It is only in the event of a large claim that physicians increase cesarean rates. But even then, the effect is minimal. Large claims do not increase the physician's cesarean rate by much more than one percentage point. Our model predicts behavior changes will be most strongly associated with those aspects of a claim that provide physicians with the most new information. In our data, this happens early in the process-at claim occurrence and reporting-for physicians, and late in the process-at claim disposition-for consumers.
These findings show why care must be taken in the measurement of physician malpractice experience in micro-level empirical analyses such as ours. Because physicians increase cesareans only in response to large claims, the average effect of a claim is small, and little or no relationship between claims and behavior would be uncovered in analyses that omit a measure of claim magnitude. Also, because physician behavior responds to claim initiation rather than claim resolution, little or no relationship between claims and behavior would be uncovered in analyses that use disposed claims as the malpractice measure, instead of claim occurrences and claims reported. These insights explain why our results contrast with the other micro-level studies in the literature.
From a policy perspective, our results help identify the types of reforms most likely to influence behavior. 14 Reforms aimed at speeding resolution of claims, such as arbitration, are unlikely to change physician behavior, though they may be desirable for other reasons. Reforms intended to reduce expected payouts, such as damage caps, may lessen the number of cesareans performed, but probably not by very much. As Dubay, Kaestner, and Waidmann (1999) also found, defensive medicine in this context does not appear to be substantial enough that the cesarean rate would be greatly lowered by a reduction in damages. And, as Localio et al. (1993) point out, alternative accountability mechanisms might also generate similar incentives for defensive medicine.
Reforms aimed at reducing uncertainty about claims initiation may be effective. These reforms could include practice parameters or changes to standards of negligence (Fournier and Liddon 1993; Localio et al. 1993 ). These measures would help physicians choose an optimal cesarean threshold and reduce any cesareans that arise from uncertainty about the judicial process. 15 A fundamental principle in human resource management and managerial economics (for example, Brickley, Clifford and Zimmerman 2004) states that incentive schemes are more effective and less costly when there is less uncertainty in their implementation. This insight applies to the malpractice system, which is an incentive scheme to ensure the quality of care.
Uncertainty also affects the consumer who cannot directly observe provider quality when choosing a physician and so must infer it based on available information (Grant 2003) . The resolution of malpractice claims provides public information that consumers can use when choosing a provider, and we provide some evidence that they do use this information-physician volume drops following the disposition of a large claim. Publicly providing information about resolved claims-which Florida does online at http://www.fldfs.com/Data/Liability/byname.aspwill influence consumers' choices of physicians and help marshall market forces to ensure quality.
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1 Studies that have examined the effect of malpractice on other behaviors include Entman et al. (1994) , who found no association between malpractice history and the quality of subsequent obstetric care; Rosenblatt et al. (1990) , who found some physicians leave obstetrics in response to being sued; and Baldwin et al. (1995) , who did not find a relationship between malpractice history and pre-natal resource use. 2 Baldwin et al. (1995) use this measure. Localio et al. (1993) use premium information at the regional level and number of claims at the physician level, both lagged to help prevent endogeneity. Carpenter et al. (1987) use recent fetal and neonatal deaths or the threat of suit; Goyert et al. (1989) utilize a survey that asks about the length of time since several malpractice-related activities. While these measures are not all synonymous, none accounts for the severity of claims. 3 Except for Ward (1991) , none of these studies focuses on obstetrics. 4 This set of risk-adjustment factors is larger than found in most studies in the literature. They were based on the expansive set used in the malpractice study of Localio et al. (1993) . Recent advances in risk adjustment for cesarean section include Aron et al. (2000) and Gregory et al. (2002) . 5 The malpractice measure does not distinguish obstetrics-related claims from other claims. Given the data, this cannot be done accurately, and it might not be desirable anyway, as physicians may alter their obstetrics procedure intensity in response to a non-obstetrics-related suit. The data and the aforementioned ACOG surveys indicate that roughly half of all claims experienced by obstetricians and gynecologists are obstetrics-related, with about 60% of those related to the delivery. 6 A single equation specification could be obtained by substituting equation 5 into equation 4. However, this would inflate the estimated standard errors because the regression errors are likely to be correlated for a given physician (Moulton 1986 ). The two-stage method implemented here eliminates this bias, with the only complication that the dependent variable in the second stage, l, is an estimated variable (a coefficient estimated in first-stage equation 4). To account for this, the inverse of the standard errors on the first stage l's are used as weights in the second-stage regression. 7 These data, made available by Barry Mittan, are drawn from public and proprietary sources, including the Florida Department of Professional Regulation and the Florida Medical Association. 8 The change in physician p's clinical risk, using the estimates from equation 4, is:
Árisk p ¼ " Fð" m þĝX jp 1995 Þ À " Fð" m þĝX jp 1992 Þ ð6Þ
where the average of F is taken across those patients served by that physician in that year and the average of l is taken across all physicians. Ideally one would like to measure clinical risk as the likelihood of complications that could lead to a malpractice claim. The likelihood of a cesarean is used instead as the closest available operational proxy. 9 The first-stage regression results are available from the authors. Due to the large number of individual observations in each sample, virtually every g coefficient was highly significant. Using a simple classification rule where a cesarean is predicted if the probability exceeds one-half and a vaginal delivery is predicted otherwise, only 10% of all deliveries were misclassified. Additional computations conducted by the authors indicate that less than 20% of the cross-physician variance in risk-adjusted cesarean rates is contributed by random error in the estimation of the first-stage equations. 10 Differences in fixed effects are translated into differences in risk-adjusted cesarean rates by computing the effect of an increase in the mean physician fixed effect on the probability of cesarean section for all mothers in the sample, and taking the average. A .1 increase in the fixed effect translates to an increase in the risk-adjusted cesarean rate of 1.3 percentage points. The standard deviation of the fixed effects across physicians is .5 in each year, yielding a standard deviation in risk-adjusted cesarean rates of 6.5 percentage points. 11 The persistence in physicians' ''true'' (not estimated) procedure intensity across time is greater than the graphs depict, because intertemporal changes in clinical risk will affect unadjusted cesarean rates, while the fixed effects will change due to sampling error in the first-stage regression. 12 Because the same independent variables are used in each of the three regressions in any row of the table, seemingly unrelated regressions offers no efficiency improvement and is not used. 13 Malpractice experience also could influence volume by influencing the likelihood a physician will stop delivering babies. To investigate this, the probability of dropping out of the sample between 1992 and 1995 was estimated from the physician characteristics and malpractice experience prior to 1993. (Using 1993-1994 malpractice experience causes simultaneity, since the physician will experience fewer suits if he/she quits practicing obstetrics after 1992.) Malpractice experience had no influence on the probability of dropping out of the sample. 14 In the mid-1980s, during a malpractice crisis far more serious than the current one, Florida's legislature passed nearly a dozen malpractice reforms. Fournier and Liddon (1993) classified these into four categories: those intended to reduce the demand for litigation by providing substitutes, such as binding arbitration; those intended to reduce de-mand by increasing the ''price'' of litigation, such as the British rule; those intended to reduce demand by reducing the expected benefits of litigation, such as caps on noneconomic damages; and those intended to influence litigation supply by changing judicial powers, such as the no-fault compensation plan for severe neurological injuries. Fournier and Liddon concluded that the reforms they analyzed were ineffective.
15 This latter is technically distinct from defensive medicine, and bears a theoretical relationship to precautionary savings in the macroeconomics literature (Leland 1968) . Defensive medicine can occur in the absence of uncertainty. The ''precautionary medicine'' that is mentioned here is generated by physicians' risk aversion in the presence of uncertainty about the likelihood of being sued and the expected costs arising from those suits.
